Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition)

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If you would like to view them, please go to the Reading Room. If you find that any of the links are broken, please let us know. Edith Stein — Beitrage zur philosophischen Begrundung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften [selections; p. Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Hrsg. Articles on Philosophy and Psychology , pp. The physical copy of this text was in such poor condition, I was not able to reproduce the entire text.

You will find only the first 39 pages on our site. This is the first essay included in critical edition of H. NASEP invites all scholars to submit abstracts on any aspect of early phenomenology. The aim of this conference is to investigate the works of early phenomenologists across a broad range of topics, including ethics, mathematics, logic, aesthetics, politics, epistemology, ontology, psychology, etc. Figures covered include, but are not limited to: Senior researchers and graduate students both are welcome to submit proposals. Graduate students should indicate their status in the email with their submission.

Abstracts should be prepared for blind review , and should not exceed words. Please send submissions and inquiries to: Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray phenomenology me. This conference has two central foci: Abstracts should be no more than words in length. Panel proposals should be no more than words in length. We welcome papers in Spanish, French, German and English. Here is a list of the contents: Here is a list of the contents of this volume note that I have altered the transliteration of Russian names in accordance with common English renderings: I was only able to obtain part of the work.

Fritz Weinmann — Zur Struktur der Melodie World Three, he argued, was the product of individual human beings in exactly the same sense that an animal path is the product of individual animals, and that, as such, has an existence and evolution independent of any individual knowing subjects. The influence of World Three, in his view, on the individual human mind World Two is at least as strong as the influence of World One.

In other words, the knowledge held by a given individual mind owes at least as much to the total accumulated wealth of human knowledge, made manifest, as to the world of direct experience. As such, the growth of human knowledge could be said to be a function of the independent evolution of World Three. Many contemporary philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have not embraced Popper's Three World conjecture, due mostly, it seems, to its resemblance to mind-body dualism. The creation—evolution controversy in the United States raises the issue of whether creationistic ideas may be legitimately called science and whether evolution itself may be legitimately called science.

In the debate, both sides and even courts in their decisions have frequently invoked Popper's criterion of falsifiability see Daubert standard. In this context, passages written by Popper are frequently quoted in which he speaks about such issues himself.


Edith Stein

For example, he famously stated " Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program—a possible framework for testable scientific theories. And yet, the theory is invaluable. I do not see how, without it, our knowledge could have grown as it has done since Darwin. In trying to explain experiments with bacteria which become adapted to, say, penicillin , it is quite clear that we are greatly helped by the theory of natural selection.

Although it is metaphysical, it sheds much light upon very concrete and very practical researches. It allows us to study adaptation to a new environment such as a penicillin-infested environment in a rational way: He also noted that theism , presented as explaining adaptation, "was worse than an open admission of failure, for it created the impression that an ultimate explanation had been reached". When speaking here of Darwinism, I shall speak always of today's theory—that is Darwin's own theory of natural selection supported by the Mendelian theory of heredity , by the theory of the mutation and recombination of genes in a gene pool, and by the decoded genetic code.

This is an immensely impressive and powerful theory. The claim that it completely explains evolution is of course a bold claim, and very far from being established. All scientific theories are conjectures, even those that have successfully passed many severe and varied tests. The Mendelian underpinning of modern Darwinism has been well tested, and so has the theory of evolution which says that all terrestrial life has evolved from a few primitive unicellular organisms, possibly even from one single organism. What makes the origin of life and of the genetic code a disturbing riddle is this: But, as Monod points out, the machinery by which the cell at least the non-primitive cell, which is the only one we know translates the code "consists of at least fifty macromolecular components which are themselves coded in the DNA ".

Monod, ; [57] , [58]. Thus the code can not be translated except by using certain products of its translation. This constitutes a really baffling circle; a vicious circle, it seems, for any attempt to form a model, or theory, of the genesis of the genetic code. Thus we may be faced with the possibility that the origin of life like the origin of the universe becomes an impenetrable barrier to science, and a residue to all attempts to reduce biology to chemistry and physics. He explained that the difficulty of testing had led some people to describe natural selection as a tautology , and that he too had in the past described the theory as "almost tautological", and had tried to explain how the theory could be untestable as is a tautology and yet of great scientific interest:.

My solution was that the doctrine of natural selection is a most successful metaphysical research programme. It raises detailed problems in many fields, and it tells us what we would expect of an acceptable solution of these problems. I still believe that natural selection works in this way as a research programme.

Nevertheless, I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation. The theory of natural selection may be so formulated that it is far from tautological. In this case it is not only testable, but it turns out to be not strictly universally true.

There seem to be exceptions, as with so many biological theories; and considering the random character of the variations on which natural selection operates, the occurrence of exceptions is not surprising. Thus not all phenomena of evolution are explained by natural selection alone. Yet in every particular case it is a challenging research program to show how far natural selection can possibly be held responsible for the evolution of a particular organ or behavioural program. These frequently quoted passages are only a very small part of what Popper wrote on the issue of evolution, however, and give the wrong impression that he mainly discussed questions of its falsifiability.

Popper never invented this criterion to give justifiable use of words like science.

In fact, Popper stresses at the beginning of Logic of Scientific Discovery that "the last thing I wish to do, however, is to advocate another dogma" [61] and that "what is to be called a 'science' and who is to be called a 'scientist' must always remain a matter of convention or decision. I do not try to justify [the aims of science which I have in mind], however, by representing them as the true or the essential aims of science. This would only distort the issue, and it would mean a relapse into positivist dogmatism. There is only one way, as far as I can see, of arguing rationally in support of my proposals.

This is to analyse their logical consequences: Popper had his own sophisticated views on evolution [65] that go much beyond what the frequently-quoted passages say. Popper understood the universe as a creative entity that invents new things, including life, but without the necessity of something like a god, especially not one who is pulling strings from behind the curtain. He said that evolution of the genotype must, as the creationists say, work in a goal-directed way [67] but disagreed with their view that it must necessarily be the hand of god that imposes these goals onto the stage of life.

Instead, he formulated the spearhead model of evolution, a version of genetic pluralism. According to this model, living organisms themselves have goals, and act according to these goals, each guided by a central control. In its most sophisticated form, this is the brain of humans, but controls also exist in much less sophisticated ways for species of lower complexity, such as the amoeba.

Induktionsspannung und Induktionsstrom/Gesetz von Faraday/Regel von Lenz (Experimentalphysik)

This control organ plays a special role in evolution—it is the "spearhead of evolution". The goals bring the purpose into the world. Mutations in the genes that determine the structure of the control may then cause drastic changes in behaviour, preferences and goals, without having an impact on the organism's phenotype. Popper postulates that such purely behavioural changes are less likely to be lethal for the organism compared to drastic changes of the phenotype.

Popper contrasts his views with the notion of the "hopeful monster" that has large phenotype mutations and calls it the "hopeful behavioural monster". After behaviour has changed radically, small but quick changes of the phenotype follow to make the organism fitter to its changed goals. This way it looks as if the phenotype were changing guided by some invisible hand, while it is merely natural selection working in combination with the new behaviour. For example, according to this hypothesis, the eating habits of the giraffe must have changed before its elongated neck evolved.

Popper contrasted this view as "evolution from within" or "active Darwinism" the organism actively trying to discover new ways of life and being on a quest for conquering new ecological niches , [69] [70] with the naturalistic "evolution from without" which has the picture of a hostile environment only trying to kill the mostly passive organism, or perhaps segregate some of its groups. About the creation-evolution controversy itself, Popper initially wrote that he considered it "a somewhat sensational clash between a brilliant scientific hypothesis concerning the history of the various species of animals and plants on earth, and an older metaphysical theory which, incidentally, happened to be part of an established religious belief" with a footnote to the effect that he "agree[s] with Professor C.

Raven when, in his Science, Religion, and the Future , , he calls this conflict 'a storm in a Victorian tea-cup'; though the force of this remark is perhaps a little impaired by the attention he pays to the vapours still emerging from the cup—to the Great Systems of Evolutionist Philosophy, produced by Bergson, Whitehead, Smuts, and others.

I have to confess that this cup of tea has become, after all, my cup of tea; and with it I have to eat humble pie. Popper and John Eccles speculated on the problem of free will for many years, generally agreeing on an interactionist dualist theory of mind. However, although Popper was a body-mind dualist, he did not think that the mind is a substance separate from the body: When he gave the second Arthur Holly Compton Memorial Lecture in , Popper revisited the idea of quantum indeterminacy as a source of human freedom.

Eccles had suggested that "critically poised neurons" might be influenced by the mind to assist in a decision. Popper criticised Compton's idea of amplified quantum events affecting the decision. The idea that the only alternative to determinism is just sheer chance was taken over by Schlick , together with many of his views on the subject, from Hume , who asserted that "the removal" of what he called "physical necessity" must always result in "the same thing with chance. As objects must either be conjoin'd or not, I shall later argue against this important doctrine according to which the alternative to determinism is sheer chance.

Yet I must admit that the doctrine seems to hold good for the quantum-theoretical models which have been designed to explain, or at least to illustrate, the possibility of human freedom. This seems to be the reason why these models are so very unsatisfactory. Hume's and Schlick's ontological thesis that there cannot exist anything intermediate between chance and determinism seems to me not only highly dogmatic not to say doctrinaire but clearly absurd; and it is understandable only on the assumption that they believed in a complete determinism in which chance has no status except as a symptom of our ignorance.

Popper called not for something between chance and necessity but for a combination of randomness and control to explain freedom, though not yet explicitly in two stages with random chance before the controlled decision, saying, "freedom is not just chance but, rather, the result of a subtle interplay between something almost random or haphazard, and something like a restrictive or selective control. Then in his book with John Eccles, The Self and its Brain , Popper finally formulates the two-stage model in a temporal sequence.

And he compares free will to Darwinian evolution and natural selection:. New ideas have a striking similarity to genetic mutations. Now, let us look for a moment at genetic mutations. Mutations are, it seems, brought about by quantum theoretical indeterminacy including radiation effects.

Accordingly, they are also probabilistic and not in themselves originally selected or adequate, but on them there subsequently operates natural selection which eliminates inappropriate mutations. Now we could conceive of a similar process with respect to new ideas and to free-will decisions, and similar things. That is to say, a range of possibilities is brought about by a probabilistic and quantum mechanically characterised set of proposals, as it were—of possibilities brought forward by the brain.

On these there then operates a kind of selective procedure which eliminates those proposals and those possibilities which are not acceptable to the mind. In an interview [31] that Popper gave in with the condition that it should be kept secret until after his death, he summarised his position on God as follows: Some forms of atheism are arrogant and ignorant and should be rejected, but agnosticism—to admit that we don't know and to search—is all right.

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When I look at what I call the gift of life, I feel a gratitude which is in tune with some religious ideas of God. However, the moment I even speak of it, I am embarrassed that I may do something wrong to God in talking about God. Why then should the Jewish myth be true and the Indian and Egyptian myths not be true? Popper helped to establish the philosophy of science as an autonomous discipline within philosophy, through his own prolific and influential works, and also through his influence on his own contemporaries and students. Popper founded in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and there lectured and influenced both Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend , two of the foremost philosophers of science in the next generation of philosophy of science.

Lakatos significantly modified Popper's position, [80]: While there is some dispute as to the matter of influence, Popper had a long-standing and close friendship with economist Friedrich Hayek , who was also brought to the London School of Economics from Vienna. Each found support and similarities in the other's work, citing each other often, though not without qualification.

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  6. In a letter to Hayek in , Popper stated, "I think I have learnt more from you than from any other living thinker, except perhaps Alfred Tarski. For his part, Hayek dedicated a collection of papers, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics , to Popper, and in said, " Popper also had long and mutually influential friendships with art historian Ernst Gombrich , biologist Peter Medawar , and neuroscientist John Carew Eccles.

    The German jurist Reinhold Zippelius uses Popper's method of "trial and error" in his legal philosophy. Popper's influence, both through his work in philosophy of science and through his political philosophy, has also extended beyond the academy. Most criticisms of Popper's philosophy are of the falsification , or error elimination, element in his account of problem solving.

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    Popper presents falsifiability as both an ideal and as an important principle in a practical method of effective human problem solving; as such, the current conclusions of science are stronger than pseudo-sciences or non-sciences , insofar as they have survived this particularly vigorous selection method. He does not argue that any such conclusions are therefore true, or that this describes the actual methods of any particular scientist. Rather, it is recommended as an essential principle of methodology that, if enacted by a system or community, will lead to slow but steady progress of a sort relative to how well the system or community enacts the method.

    It has been suggested that Popper's ideas are often mistaken for a hard logical account of truth because of the historical co-incidence of their appearing at the same time as logical positivism , the followers of which mistook his aims for their own. The Quine-Duhem thesis argues that it's impossible to test a single hypothesis on its own, since each one comes as part of an environment of theories.

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    Thus we can only say that the whole package of relevant theories has been collectively falsified, but cannot conclusively say which element of the package must be replaced. An example of this is given by the discovery of the planet Neptune: For Popper, theories are accepted or rejected via a sort of selection process.

    Theories that say more about the way things appear are to be preferred over those that do not; the more generally applicable a theory is, the greater its value. Thus Newton's laws, with their wide general application, are to be preferred over the much more specific "the solar system has seven planets". The philosopher Thomas Kuhn writes in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that he places an emphasis on anomalous experiences similar to that Popper places on falsification.

    However, he adds that anomalous experiences cannot be identified with falsification, and questions whether theories could be falsified in the manner suggested by Popper. Popper claimed to have recognised already in the version of his Logic of Discovery a fact later stressed by Kuhn, "that scientists necessarily develop their ideas within a definite theoretical framework", and to that extent to have anticipated Kuhn's central point about "normal science". The scientific tradition is distinguished from the pre-scientific tradition in having two layers.

    Like the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a critical attitude towards them. The theories are passed on, not as dogmas, but rather with the challenge to discuss them and improve upon them. Another objection is that it is not always possible to demonstrate falsehood definitively, especially if one is using statistical criteria to evaluate a null hypothesis.

    More generally it is not always clear, if evidence contradicts a hypothesis, that this is a sign of flaws in the hypothesis rather than of flaws in the evidence. However, this is a misunderstanding of what Popper's philosophy of science sets out to do. Rather than offering a set of instructions that merely need to be followed diligently to achieve science, Popper makes it clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery that his belief is that the resolution of conflicts between hypotheses and observations can only be a matter of the collective judgment of scientists, in each individual case.

    In Science Versus Crime , Houck writes [91] that Popper's falsificationism can be questioned logically: These examples were pointed out by Carl Gustav Hempel. Hempel came to acknowledge that Logical Positivism's verificationism was untenable, but argued that falsificationism was equally untenable on logical grounds alone. The simplest response to this is that, because Popper describes how theories attain, maintain and lose scientific status, individual consequences of currently accepted scientific theories are scientific in the sense of being part of tentative scientific knowledge, and both of Hempel's examples fall under this category.

    For instance, atomic theory implies that all metals melt at some temperature. An early adversary of Popper's critical rationalism, Karl-Otto Apel attempted a comprehensive refutation of Popper's philosophy. In Transformation der Philosophie , Apel charged Popper with being guilty of, amongst other things, a pragmatic contradiction. Scruton maintains that Freudian theory has both "theoretical terms" and "empirical content. Nevertheless, Scruton also concluded that Freudian theory is not genuinely scientific. According to Taylor, Popper's criticisms are completely baseless, but they are received with an attention and respect that Popper's "intrinsic worth hardly merits".

    The philosopher John Gray writes in Straw Dogs that Popper's account of scientific method would have prevented the theories of Charles Darwin and Albert Einstein from being accepted. The philosopher and psychologist Michel ter Hark writes in Popper, Otto Selz and the rise of evolutionary epistemology that Popper took some of his ideas from his tutor, the German psychologist Otto Selz.

    Selz never published his ideas, partly because of the rise of Nazism , which forced him to quit his work in , and the prohibition of referring to Selz' work. Popper, the historian of ideas and his scholarship, is criticised in some academic quarters for his rejection of Plato, Hegel and Marx. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. London , England , UK. Epistemology Rationality Philosophy of science Logic Social and political philosophy Metaphysics Philosophy of mind Origin of life Interpretations of quantum mechanics.

    This section may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. Please consider splitting content into sub-articles, condensing it, or adding or removing subheadings. History of liberalism Contributions to liberal theory. Democratic capitalism Liberal bias in academia. An Evolutionary Approach , , Rev. An Intellectual Autobiography , []. Giancarlo Bosetti, English translation: Edited by Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris Turner, this volume contains a large number of Popper's previously unpublished or uncollected writings on political and social themes.

    Philosophy of science portal Liberalism portal. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Karl Popper Winter ed. Contemporary influences" in Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Karl Popper — The Formative Years, — Politics and Philosophy in Interwar Vienna. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press 2nd ed. From Physics to Metaphysics. Shadows of the Mind. Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society. Proceedings of the British Academy. Fifty Major Political Thinkers.

    Popper — The Intellectual Warrior". Cambridge University Press, The Story of Philosophy. DK Publishing , Retrieved 21 December Kritischer Rationalismus und Verteidigung der offenen Gesellschaft. An Intellectual Autobiography , p. The Great Philosophers London: Neue Folge Band 18 , S. Kantian therapies for the crisis in psychology," in: Philosopher of 'Open Society ' ". The New York Times. Retrieved 15 November Sir Karl Popper, a philosopher who was a defender of democratic systems of government, died today in a hospital here.

    He died of complications of cancer, pneumonia and kidney failure, said a manager at the hospital in this London suburb. Retrieved 12 August Karl Popper On God: Retrieved 1 December Archived from the original on 23 May Retrieved 9 June A Centenary Assessment Volume I. Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? Oxford University Press , ch. The myth of the framework: Retrieved 26 April A Development of Popper's Ideas. City University of Hong Kong. Karl Popper - the Formative Years, All Life is Problem Solving. An Intellectual Autobiography , pp.

    Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics , p. Retrieved 22 February Popper on natural selection's testability". Retrieved 26 May Editions du Seuil, Paris. Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems. Retrieved 18 October Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge. The philosophy of Karl Popper , section See also John Watkins: Primary sources are, in particular, Objective Knowledge: An evolutionary approach , section "Evolution and the Tree of Knowledge"; Evolutionary epistemology Eds.

    Bartley , section "Natural selection and the emergence of mind"; In search of a better world , section "Knowledge and the shaping of rationality: In Defence of Interaction , section "World 3 and emergent evolution"; A world of propensities , section "Towards an evolutionary theory of knowledge"; and The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism with John C. Eccles , sections "The biological approach to human knowledge and intelligence" and "The biological function of conscious and intelligent activity".

    Karl Popper, a scientific memoir. Out of Error , p. The Hopeful Behavioural Monster" p. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism , p. Objective Knowledge , corrected edition, p. An Evolutionary Approach , Oxford pp. The Self and Its Brain: All life is problem solving , chapter 7, pp. Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason. Duke University Press Books. Retrieved 22 January The Age of Fallibility. University of Chicago Press. Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: University of California Press.

    Levinson , New York, , Russell and Russell, Wissenschaftstheorie, Sozialphilosophie, Logik, Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, Naturwissenschaften. Schriftenreihe der Karl Popper Foundation Klagenfurt. Current edition Gattei, Stefano. Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science. A Restatement and Defence. Princeton Princeton University Press.

    Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition) Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition)
    Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition) Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition)
    Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition) Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition)
    Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition) Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition)
    Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition) Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition)
    Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition) Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition)
    Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition) Die Induktion - Das Problem der Wissenschaft mit der Erkenntnistheorie (German Edition)

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