Elitenmacht nach Bourdieu (German Edition)


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This ebook tells the tale of a society reversing deeply held worldviews and revolutionizing its demography. In components of eighteenth-century Japan, raised in simple terms or 3 little ones. As villages shrank and area headcounts faded, posters of child-murdering she-devils began appearing, and governments provided to pay their matters to have extra young children. Get Caste and Democracy in India: This booklet makes claims approximately Jati caste and democracy in India.

First, Social Scientists have basically partly understood the realities embedded within the establishment of Jati. Beau de Lomenie 3 vol. Coignard , Dans les Beaux Quartiers by M. Mehl ; and a large number of books published by outstanding and perspicacious journalists. Thus, this circumference is at the same time large and restricted.

Large, because it tends to overlap with the highest elite strata, including wealth and income as possible criteria. But with this mundane world we are at the periphery of the ruling elites. This essay focuses on only the first circumference. It is difficult to delineate it precisely, because its borders are blurred.

They are blurred because they are porous, as a result of constant elite circulation. As a working hypothesis, it could be evaluated at 5, people. A little more or a little less would not change the nature of the problem that we have to face: In the study of the upper strata, too much emphasis has been given to the notion of insufficient upward mobility, and not enough to the downward movement. Too much emphasis was given to those who succeeded in their careers in each generation, forgetting those who failed.

Many fragmented historical studies have suggested that at the highest levels of the French society, most social functions are not inherited. In order to validate empirically the intergenerational mobility, two generations are needed: In the 1, pages of these three volumes, more than 90 percent of the content consists of biographical information. A limited number of pages contain commentaries which we do not need to take into consideration, because they are complaints about social inequality and concentration of capital, or polemical statements about oligarchies and the capitalist system.

Ignoring these commentaries, the three volumes are in fact a biographical dictionary of contemporaries. This dictionary required many years of work 1 The period June to August is not covered in this essay. For this period, see Robert O. In these three volumes Hamon mentioned the names of some 2, families including about 6, individuals and covering three generations from the period to The most valuable information that we get from this publication is the relation between families, even when the names change by female filiation.

The amount of endogamy in these privileged strata during this epoch is impressive. We also learn that the inheritance of wealth and status are not necessarily accompanied by continuity in the same domain of activity. The son of a banker, for example, may become an academician, and his grandson a politician. Taking together all these privileged positions — famous politicians, old aristocracy, the nouveaux riches, the most renowned people in each profession, great proprietors, highest civil servants, managers of large corporations, high military officers, many bishops, famous writers, and so on — we may estimate at 20,, the number of persons whose names have appeared in various biographical dictionaries and professional directories during the generation Among these individuals only 20 to 30 percent were heirs in the sociological sense, that is, sons born in elite families.

The newcomers are particularly numerous among politicians, intellectuals and celebrities. By combining various social registers and directories, some evaluations are possible. Even if the empirical data are incomplete and incongruous, it is possible to estimate that 70 percent of the 10, individuals in the highest positions, a more restricted strata of ruling elites, during the period were not the sons, nephews, nor sons-in-law of the 10, individuals in the same or equivalent positions during the previous generation at that time few women were mentioned in biographical dictionaries. The proportion of heirs was considerable for the patrimonial elite, and much less for administrative elite.

For the generation , the most plausible hypothesis, based on a sample, is that percent of the people in the 10, highest elite positions were not the sons, sons-in-law, nephews or daughters of the 10, individuals in similar positions during the interbellum period. Among sons of individuals at the summit of politics, economy, or State administration, 5, or 20, or 30 — according to the social context and to the historical period — succeeded in maintaining themselves at the highest level; the others stepped down the social ladder. This downward movement has been accelerated by eleven regime changes since , phenomenon to be discussed below.

Look at the social mobility around yourself: In some large families, one son may be Is there a Ruling Class in France? Most of the sons, nephews and son-in-laws of those who were included in the edition were not mentioned in the edition. Simultaneously, several thousand people who were mentioned in the edition were not descendants of those who were included in the edition.

However, this analysis raises several problems because in many cases the female filiations do not appear, since the names are listed by the paternal line. The downward social movement from one generation to the next cannot be analysed separately for each elite category, because the son of a general may make a career in industry, and the son of a political leader, in the higher state administration, or vice-versa.

In order to measure the upward and downward movements, meticulous research is necessary. My own investigations do not permit me to present precise statistics. It is nonetheless possible to estimate that the downward movement, that is to say the exclusion from the highest elitist circles over a period of 40 years approaches percent.

In other words, from one generation to the next at a distance of 40 years, at the summits of the society and the State, the social reproduction of elites is limited to a tiny minority. The large majority of personalities who dominated and governed the French society in were not the heirs or the descendents of those who dominated or governed 40 years earlier. We should not draw from this that in 20 years the elite has been changed entirely, because the annual editions of this reference book reflect mostly a demographic movement.

In effect, many of the names that disappear from one edition to the next are those of deceased personalities. The exclusion from the listing for the reason of downward social movement, like electoral defeats or loss of privileged positions in organizations and corporations, explains only part of the change. The demographic replacement of elites leaves room for a social reproduction in a proportion that we estimate to be less than one-tenth over a period of 40 years. The hereditary transmission of wealth is a component of any theory of ruling class.

How much of wealth is transmitted hereditarily in France? A distinction is needed between two kinds of wealth: In France, the first category is tax-exempt, the second is submitted to taxation. The monthly economic magazine, Challenges, with the help of a specialized financial institution, has inventoried every year since the capital of thousands of enterprises, and has selected each year the most important of them according to their capital, amount of trade and benefits. The largest enterprises in can be divided into two categories: In spite of the massive nationalization of banks, insurance companies and large enterprises in the aftermath of World War II and again in the s, when the socialist party came to power, a large part of the French industrial, financial and commercial enterprises in were in the hands of private owners of capital, represented in most cases by families rather than individuals.

Contrary to some stereotypes, the majority of these businessmen did not inherit their capital. Most of them are the founders of their enterprises, or at least have developed it enough to reach the top circle of the largest companies. This fact is well established, and no debate about ruling class can avoid taking it into consideration. Related to the hereditary transmission of elite positions is the problem of cousinhood.

An interesting feature is the intermingling by marriage among the economic elite, and the absence of such an alliance by intermarriage between the economic elite and the political elite.

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The intervening factor is age. Most political aspirants get married before age of At that age, the aspirant politician of middle class origin is a man whose future is uncertain; he does not yet have relations in the upper class; he has not yet established himself. He marries a woman of his own social milieu.

When twenty or thirty years later he becomes an important politician, it is too late for him to marry a rich heiress. The daughter of a rich industrialist would be more attracted by a young man detected by one of few selective schools and who therefore is promised to a nice career. The annual ball of the Ecole polytechnique and of other select schools is organized precisely to facilitate encounters between promising young men and potential rich heiresses.

Among the owners of capital, endogamy is widely practised, and this custom is a supplementary reason for their relative isolation in the elite configuration. Intervening in the elite circulation is a factor which is neglected in the sociological literature, and which is of an interdisciplinary nature. Everyone, even if he or she is not a sociologist, can perceive around him or her people of unequal intelligence and a great variety of intellectual endowment: No professional category is in a better strategic position than teachers to observe intellectual inequality among children and teenagers.

In France, for generations, schoolteachers have been able to detect in primary schools among the rural and modest populations, gifted children at the age of 10, who merited the aid of scholarships. We should not confuse genetic chance and biologic heredity. The hereditary characteristics are often transmitted, particularly in the physical traits. On the contrary, the genetic selection escapes from heredity. It sorts the effects of heredity, precisely because it occurs at each birth from the genetic puzzle. What we know today, thanks to genetic science, was necessarily ignored by the elitist school of the beginning of the last century, particularly by Pareto.

The genetic selection results from chance, the biological heredity is determined. These are clearly two different notions. Two historical examples would help to understand the difference. King George VI of Britain was a stutterer as a result of the genetic lottery. The Austrian imperial family suffered at a certain historical period from poor hereditary traits, well-captured by several Austrian painters.


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  2. Lucrezia Borgia: Das Leben einer Papsttochter in der Renaissance (German Edition).
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The genetic lottery is a significant factor in elite circulation. It seems that the thesis of social reproduction of elites, defended by Pierre Bourdieu, and which is justified when it refers to the elitist selection by scholarly success in privileged social milieu in school systems, appears in a sense exaggerated when one considers the problem of elite circulation over a long historical period. The social reproduction by scholarly tracks is not a specific French phenomenon.

The school as a springboard for vertical social mobility exists, in different forms, in Britain, the United States, and Japan, as well as in other countries. Each generation experiences a significant downward movement from the summits of power. What is surprising is not so much, for example, that a certain number of sons of higher civil servants are themselves becoming higher civil servants, but that a high proportion of sons of privileged families do not succeed in maintaining themselves at the same rank as their parents.

Such a metabolism of elites is not particular to France. It has been observed in many countries.

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It is a sociological fact that most of the power positions in France are not today, and have not been in the past, transmitted by heredity. So the humble citizen needs not be afraid that the sons of his masters will become the masters of his own sons, as it is the case in the typical ruling class systems. The hereditary transmission of wealth has its own logic and justification in all industrial and post-industrial societies. But the transmission of political positions by direct inheritance is impossible in a democratic regime based on universal suffrage.

We should not confound the direct juridical transmission of wealth with the more complex phenomenon of social selfreproduction. According to the analysis of the documentation that I have collected for the Third and Fourth Republics , some 6, deputies were elected. Among them, about 1, — a proportion of 15 percent — were the sons, grandsons, sons-in-law or nephews of deputies, senators, leaders of parties, mayors of big cities or of political journalists. In some cases, the fathers or grandfathers were active in politics before The proportion of 15 percent is not outrageous since in a typical ruling class system the rate of social reproduction would reach almost per cent.

In a democratic regime, it is not conceivable to forbid the descendants of politicians to make themselves a political career, as it would not be admissible to forbid the sons of lawyers or of architects to become, in their turn, lawyers or architects. In politics, social reproduction implies the transmission of vocation, of a precious understanding of the rules of the political game, of a network of useful relationships, or the inheritance of a name, but not the automatic transmission of the political mandate.

The descendants have to succeed themselves in the electoral battle. There is another way to read these figures: The available documentation does not permit to present here precise figures, but from what is available, it appears that in most cases the sons, grandsons, nephews, of the 6, deputies have slipped down the social ladder, since their names do not appear in the select directories and social registers one generation later. First of all, there are the heirs of the great political families of the older regimes — monarchy or empire — who were present in a significant number in the first legislatures of the Third Republic: When the father died, one of his sons succeeded him in Parliament.

As the patrimony, the parliamentary seat was transmitted from father to son, or from uncle to nephew. This phenomenon occurred everywhere in France, but more frequently in the northwest and in the southwest. These deputies manifested a conservative ideology. Few of them abandoned their land in order to invest in industry. Their conservatism was based on land ownership. Generally, the political career was not for them a means of enrichment. At the moment of their election, they belonged already to the social elite, but not to the most prestigious.

They represented the traditional forces, economically and politically. Few of them became famous in national politics, even if they were popular in their own constituency. The third type of deputy generated by social self-reproduction is very different from the two others.

First of all, by his social origin, in most cases from the middle or lower-middle bourgeoisie; and also by his political orientation, since most were oriented towards the centre or leftist parties. What he inherited was an interest in politics, but he did not receive the parliamentary seat as an inheritance; he had to fight for it. Certainly, he was better prepared for a political career, better armed in the political arena than his adversary whose name was less known by the voters.

Usually he obtained more easily, thanks to his family relations, the investiture of the party. But in this case, there was not a hereditary transmission of the seat itself. Some deputies of the Third Republic, and some deputies of the Fourth Republic belonged to this third type. Too much importance has been given to political genealogies by the mass media. But if we look to the summit of the political pyramid, at the highest national elite strata, less than 10 percent of the descendants of the political personalities in appear at the same highest national level forty years later in , and in many cases, they succeeded in other sectors than the political domain; for instance, in science, letters or mass-media.

Thus, from one generation to the next there is a downwards social mobility in the Paretian sense of the term, which is compensated by an upward movement in an equivalent number. The social positions of the fathers and sons were entered when they were at full maturity, i. Social reproduction is the weakest among artists, novelists, stage actors, movie stars, renowned academics; in other words, creators by excellence; it is the strongest among the sons of founders of great enterprises and other successful entrepreneurs, but their sons had to demonstrate in their turn that they had the qualities required to be an efficient entrepreneur.

Three illustrations, among dozens of possible examples, are given here. The Gaullist Louis Joxe and his son, Pierre Joxe, a socialist, have both acceded to the pinnacle of the higher administration as president of the Cour des Comptes. Both have occupied powerful positions as ministers, the first at the time of de Gaulle, the second at the time of Mitterrand.

Both were born in a golden cradle, since the father had himself been the grandson of a famous academic and historian, Daniel Halevy. But the son did not receive these positions as a gift, he had to conquer them in his turn. From Notables to Meritocracy Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone recall to all the elementary truth that democracy does not deny the inevitability of elites What matters are the modalities of their recruitment. In the literature on elites, too many social scientists confuse social inequalities in the society at large and the unequal propensity of various social strata to generate governing elites Dogan Social inequalities can be striking and deplorable, but they are not by themselves necessarily the proof of the existence of a ruling class.

For instance, in the United States in the s, the richest one-half percent of American families owned 40 percent of all corporate stocks. In France at the same moment, 10 percent of the families owned half of the real estate. Similar figures could be given for most advanced democracies. Such figures are not comparable to statistics concerning the land distribution in Tsarist Russia of the 18th century, where the ruling class had exclusive access to most resources.

If we dilute the concept of ruling class so much as to confound it with social inequality, we risk seeing ruling classes everywhere. We know from history that even an outrageously inegalitarian society which knows how to provide a societal safety-valve, can survive for centuries without creating a true ruling class. How are the various elite categories recruited in France? We may start with the category which is viewed by folklore and by many social scientists as the most closed: Surveys in conducted by a financial monthly magazine, Challenges, already referred to, ranked the largest professional patrimonies, counting only the capital invested in enterprises, and excluding the investment of other forms of property not involved in economic activities.

The principal managers of these largest patrimonies in most cases, families rather than individuals were divided into two groups according to the status of the principal managers: The distinction between the two is not always clear enough, but on this point we have to trust the judgement of those who conducted the survey. In , among the owners of richest patrimonies the number of builders of enterprises almost equals the number of heirs.

This is a surprising fact, neglected by many economists, and largely unknown by the general public. The starting point of these fortunes is, in many cases, an original and seminal idea or a technological discovery and available venture capital, a crucial factor for the stock market start-up firms. Some of these successful persons have not benefited from education beyond the baccalaureat. A society in which one out of every two multi-millionaires or billionaires starts from a low level and is propelled in one generation to a high and admired position in the economy cannot be a society controlled by a ruling class.

Such a phenomenon would be inconceivable in a ruling class system. If so many of the most successful capitalists are not the sons of the greatest capitalists, then, evidently, the inheritance is limited. Before the revolution of there a was true ruling class in France, lacking a safety-value, which was almost hermetically closed to newcomers of the bourgeoisie. What is the position of the old aristocracy among the elites of modern France?

Using a list of families of the oldest aristocracy, having five centuries of presence in the nobility Jougla de Morenas and comparing it with the lists of various kinds of higher elites in politics, state bureaucracy, finance, diplomacy, science and arts, one does not detect, two centuries after the revolution, more than 2 or 3 percent of names of the old aristocracy among the names of the most privileged, powerful or prestigious elites.

In two domains, diplomacy and finance, aristocratic names have survived more easily. Curiously enough — and this should not be considered as an anecdote, but as a significant historical fact — two dozen aristocratic names, or old patrician names with particules, have surrounded several presidents and prime ministers, particularly in the entourage of Ch. Balladur in the Matignon palace. How can such a predominance of aristocratic names at the heights of the Republic be explained?

Should we see here a grain of anachronistic vanity or some hereditary trait? Trends in the social origins of French Deputies in percentages Elections de Nobility Upper bourgeoisie Middle bourgeoisie Lower bourgeoisie Working class 34 36 19 8 3 23 32 30 10 5 10 30 35 15 10 5 24 36 20 15 3 18 43 19 17 2 16 46 21 15 2 15 47 24 12 2 15 48 25 10 Source: From my own research based on my dataset. Same source for tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. In a democracy, for ordinary people the most significant avenue for rising to the elite level is, obviously, through elections.

Historically, in most Western countries, the electoral battle has been a fight against the traditional ruling class. In many countries, in spite of the logical contradiction between the ruling class and parliamentary representation, the two have coexisted for generations. In Britain, the traditional elites, called the establishment, already in decline, was still visible in s. Since the electoral representation has progressively corroded the highest ranks of the State and of the society.

The replacement of the old ruling elites by new ones has been incremental, cumulative, and longitudinal. Each change of regime resulted in the elimination of part of the ruling elite royalists or bonapartists. At the first elections of the Third Republic in , nobles were elected. So too were many other candidates having prominent names.

In , one every three deputies had blue blood. Aristocrats were less numerous in the following assemblies. They continued to represent nevertheless, until the end of the 19th century, an important group in the rightist rows of the parliamentary hemicycle. During the period , 11 percent of the deputies were of aristocratic or patrician origin; between the two wars 9 percent; during the twelve years of the Fourth Republic, 3 per cent Dogan Since , the percentages have held steady between 2 and 3 percent.

During the first thirty years of the Third Republic the bourgeoisie furnished 40 percent of the deputies; between and , 35 percent; and appointed as aide colonel de Bonneval and as chief of his personal staff general de Beaufort. As they were invited by the famous leader Gambetta, these grand bourgeois rapidly took the best places in the political forum: Come with us, we will guarantee you a high rank, honour and power which will enable you to exercise your aptitudes for the benefit of all. The working class, urban or rural, sent, until the end of the nineteenth century only a few deputies to parliament.

In it was possible to count 30 deputies of modest social origin, who had climbed the social ladder through the free schools of the democratic regime and through the unions. They had to confront deputies born into the aristocracy and to into the upper bourgeoisie. The physiognomy of the parliament at the end of the Third Republic was very different: A new change intervened after the second world war: The proportion of deputies born into the middle or lower bourgeoisie went from one-third during the period , to about one-half between and , to 70 percent for the Fourth Republic, and remained at this level with slight variations between and It reached 75 percent between and This dominance of the middle classes was achieved to the detriment of the nobility and of the upper bourgeoisie.

A silent revolution was accomplished in parliamentary representation.

Pierre Bourdieu Prize Lecture April 4, 1996, Part 1

The same transformation has been documented for cabinet ministers. Detailed studies have been published on the distribution of deputies and ministers according to their profession Dogan , , , , , These studies have shown that the recruitment of the parliamentary elite, in comparison with the other elite categories, has the largest social basis. Similar studies conducted in other European countries have shown that this is a general phenomenon in Europe, which could be formulated as a sociological rule: Such a tendency was anticipated by all revolutionary or radical movements.

History confirmed their hopes. The programmed decline of the old ruling Is there a Ruling Class in France? From the grand bourgeoisie to the middle and lower bourgeoisie Nobility Grande bourgeoisie Middle bourgeoisie Lower bourgeoisie Working class No information Total ministers 1 38 14 51 25 4 4 2 4 37 33 17 7 2 3 12 57 16 7 5 3 14 54 18 6 5 2 12 53 22 6 5 ministers have exercised their functions before and after The old elites have been eliminated from the political forum mostly by electoral fights and meritocracy.

Violent actions have accelerated the process. But contrary to old and naive views, it has not been replaced by a representative sample of the population. In reality, politicians are recruited from a few professional categories, which require the same qualities as those necessary for political careers. The notion of osmosis explains the parliamentary recruitment Dogan Parliamentary representation is not and cannot be based on proportionality, otherwise it would result in a kind of corporatism.

If, in the electoral process, some professions are favoured more than others, such a distortion of the proportional distribution is in fact a selective process, even if it implies some unequal promotion. Three meritocratic professional categories: The lawyers and other juridical Elites. The number of lawyers, notaries, barristers, and magistrates among legislators has always been very high in the French parliament, even in the revolutionary assemblies at the end of the 18th century.

People like Danton and Robespierre were lawyers. There were men of law in the Assembly elected in ; in ; in ; in ; in ; in ; and in One finds a continuous diminution beginning with World War I. In , jurists were no more that ; in , ; in , 73; and in , the last elections of the Fourth Republic, 69 lawyers were elected. Lawyers represented 29 per cent of the actual legislators of the period to ; 24 per cent of those elected between the two world wars; and only 13 per cent of the deputies of the Fourth Republic.

However, even in the years after World War Two, lawyers were the most numerous occupational group in parliament Dogan The lawyer is one of the most familiar figures in the legislative forum, because juridical vocations seem to predispose men to a political career. The important role that lawyers play in political life, a phenomenon not unique to France, is largely explained by the fact that they possess many of the qualities required from political men: Knowledge of Is there a Ruling Class in France?

Successful lawyers are those who know the techniques and legal procedures and those who make use of them with talent, not those who seek only clients whose causes are just. Lawyers comport themselves the same way in political life.

Many of them adhere to a party without much preoccupation with ideological problems. Very often, the lawyer who is a deputy can, better than a deputy who was once a businessman, defend the interests of businessmen on the legislative stage, in the same way that, in court, he can better defend an accused person that the accused could himself. The large number of lawyers among legislators is also explained by the possibility for the legal profession to be temporarily abandoned and taken up again in case of electoral defeat.

There is no incompatibility between the legislative function and the vocation of law, as there is for many other professions. The professors and other educators. In , a quarter of deputies were originally professors or schoolteachers. During the Fourth Republic , more than one hundred among the 1, came also from the educational profession. During the previous period, between to , deputies had formerly been engaged in either secondary or university instruction. In France, as in several other Catholic countries — before the era of television and of mass communication — the schoolteacher and the priest were the intellectuals of small towns.

Both of them came from modest social strata, but politically they were involved in opposite camps. Only the schoolteachers succeeded in politics. The priests, for a variety of historical reasons that do not need to be mentioned here, remained outside the political arenas. Since , there were never more than three or four ecclesiastics in parliament. The schoolteachers were predominant among the socialist and communist ranks, as militants and middlemen in the parties.

A large number several thousand of them were secretaries of town halls a function to be distinguished of that of the mayor. During the Fourth Republic, about one quarter of the elected members of the local and regional committees of the Socialist party were teachers. Political activity was for them one of the few roads of promotion.

If the son of a teacher could hope to improve his social status and arrive at a better social position than his father, the schoolteacher himself had few means of advancement. It is significant that quite a number of the most prestigious French politicians were sons or grandsons of teachers: No other profession favours as much the vertical social mobility as that of teaching. This fact is significant for a country where the Catholic priesthood, for obvious reasons, cannot reproduce itself, while in many Protestant countries one of the most important vectors of social promotion was precisely the clergy.

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The journalists and specialists of mass media. The French press has long been decentralised; the circulation of the provincial press — made up of a very large number of small local or regional newspapers — has in older times been larger than that of the Parisian press.

Often, running a newspaper was a point of departure for parliament. One may distinguish three types of parliamentary journalists. The first is the authentic journalist who came to politics through journalism, the man whose principal political weapon is his newspaper. The second is the legislator who is not a professional journalist, much less a firstclass one, but a person for whom a newspaper is nevertheless one of the means of action and attack.

He has not come to politics through journalism — rather, political activity has led him to an interest in journalism. First he was a political militant, then a political journalist, finally a deputy. The third is the amateur journalist — the occasional journalist who is neither the publisher, nor editor, nor a regular contributor to a newspaper. He simply collaborates with various newspapers in his constituency. This kind of legislator, for whom the press has not really been a political device is very common, so much that it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that every legislator is a part-time journalist.

Parliamentarians of the first rank need journals with large a circulation. No provincial journal is without a parliamentary representative, and reciprocally, no parliamentarian is without a journal. However, for the period to , out of a total of 2, deputies, at least — that is, one-third — found in journalism a route for rising, to some degree at least, in the political hierarchy.

Among these, about were professional journalists, and between to started in a different occupation, but became regular journalistic contributors before reaching the legislature Dogan Since , the number of lawyers and journalists has declined, and the number of civil servants has increased, among them the schoolteachers and the professors, who, in France, are civil servants. In democratic regimes, political life is largely composed of written and spoken words.

It is therefore not surprising to see that so many politicians are recruited among professions who know how to craft words. Max Weber had already observed, just after World War One, that politics was increasingly being carried out publicly with spoken and written words. The talent to craft words is a meritocratic achievement. It is not favoured in a society controlled by a ruling class.

Even sons and grandsons of immigrants have succeeded in climbing to the top of the political pyramid. Raymond Forni, president of the National Assembly , is the son of an Italian worker; Edouard Balladur, former prime minister, is the grandson of an Armenian immigrant, and so is the minister Patrick Devedjian, Rene Monory, former president of the Senate, is the son of a garage keeper. Nicolas Sarkozy, minister of Finance and later minister of the Interior is the son of a Hungarian aristocrat who fled the Communist regime. Gaudin, Paul Bacon, Quillot, and many leaders of the Communist party.

These two criteria are cumulative. We should add a third one, political ambition, but such a vocation can be implicitly admitted. Professionalization implies the acquisition of a specific competence. It is the opposite of amateurism. There are professional politicians as there are professional musicians, actors or athletes. In many occupations the word professionalization is synonymous with specialization, but in politics it means general competence. A politician does not need to be an expert in a particular domain, but he needs non-specialized knowledge in many domains. Elitenmacht nach bourdieu german edition by leopold hensel pdf.

The only child of a peasant sharecropper turned postman, he left his region on the recommendation of a high school teacher to pursue an elite academic curriculum in paris. Bourdieu and habitus the french sociologist pierre bourdieu approaches power within the context of a comprehensive theory of society which like that of foucault we cant possibly do justice to here, or easily express in the form of applied methods navarro Bourdieu and habitus understanding power for social. As part of a mixed interdisciplinary team involving sociologists, historians, and anthropologists, he led the magazine enquetes.

Jeanclaude passeron born 26 november is a french sociologist and leader of social science studies. Critical theory, political sociology, and critical sociology and sociology of critique. Read or download elitenmacht nach bourdieu german edition pdf.

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Elitenmacht nach Bourdieu (German Edition) Elitenmacht nach Bourdieu (German Edition)
Elitenmacht nach Bourdieu (German Edition) Elitenmacht nach Bourdieu (German Edition)
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